This article documents an apparentpricing anomaly involving 9¼ percent, 3O-year Treasury bonds during the months of May and June 1986. During this period, the price of the 9¼: rose sharply relative to the prices of other long-term Treasury bonds and created a potential arbitrage opportunity. In addition, owners of the 9¼ bonds were able to borrow at a zero interest rate by pledging their bonds. Detailed examination reveals that this relative pricing anomaly cannot be attributed to changes in the level or term structure of interest rates or to differences between the bonds with respect to liquidity, taxation, or duration.
from rational pricing are difficult to distinguish 2 Second, as Summers (1986) observes, most traditional tests have little power against a variety of alternative hypotheses to rational pricing.
This article sheds light on the rational pricing controversy by examining in detail an apparent anomaly In the relative pricing of U.S. Treasury bonds. Treasury bonds are particularly well suited for studying relative pricing anomalies. First, these bonds have known cash payouts, which makes it easier to define what is meant by comparable securities. Second, the Treasury-bond market is highly liquid compared with markets for other fixed income securities and the market for many common stocks, so that accurate price information is readily available.
The specific episode studied here involves the pricing of the 30-year, 9¼ percent coupon Treasury bonds in May and June of 1986. During this period, the yield differential between the 9¼s and other long-term Treasury bonds suddenly widened sharply before returning to its normal level. At one point, the yield gap was so large that the 9¼s sold for mote than the Treasury 9 7/8s, despite the fact that the two bonds matured within three months of each other. An understanding of why this pricing anomaly occurred might shed some light on the rational pricing controversy.
The article is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and presents the findings. Section 2 discusses possible explanations for the peculiar behavior of the price of the 9¼ bonds. To anticipate the conclusion, the article shows that commonly cited reasons for differential yields-such as the coupon rate, the tax timing option, duration, and liquidity-fail to explain the observed pricing anomaly. The final section discusses the implications of the results.
Data and Findings

Background and initial findings
The Treasury 9¼ studied here were issued on February 8,1986 , and mature in February 2016. Although the anomalous price behavior occurred during May-June 1986, the sample period for the study runs from January 3,1986, to August 29,1986 , to show the transient nature of the phenomenon. The closing bid and ask prices and yields to maturity were taken from The Wall Street Journal; repurchase rates were provided by a major securities firm. 3 The price of the 9¼s may be compared either with prices of individual cornparables or with a portfolio of Treasury bonds constructed in such a way as to exactly match the cash flows of the 9¼s Three prior issues are 2 For Instance, Merton (1987) notes that six years after publication of the first studies by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) , there is still disagreement about whether a small-firm effect exists. A similar debate has arisen regarding whether the long-run patterns of stock returns reported by Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988) represent profit opportunities or variations in expected returns. 3 The Wall Street Journal computes yields to maturity using the ask prices. The traders who provided the data asked that their firm remain anonymous.
closely comparable to the 9¼s of 2016: the 11¼s that mature in February 2015, the 10 5/8s that mature in August 2015, and the 9 7/8s that mature in November 2015. These three Treasury bonds were issued within one year of the 9¼s and are taxed similarly. Thus, the cash flows produced by the 9¼ bonds could be closely matched by investment in any of these three comparable securities. It is preferable to select one of these bonds as the comparable rather than using a portfolio to minimize the tax timing problem. As Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984) note, the tax timing option attached to a portfolio of bonds is greater than the timing option attached to an individual bond. This implies that a portfolio of two bonds, which would have the same cash flow stream as a third bond if held to maturity, has a higher value for a taxable investor than does an individual bond.
Of the three bonds, the best choice for measuring the price performance of the 9¼s is the 9 7/8 issue. First, it is most comparable to the 9¼ in terms of coupon and maturity. Second, the 9 7/8s are the most conservative choice because the anomaly involves the yield on the 9¼s being "too" low and, as shown in Figure 1 , the 9 7/8s have the lowest yield among the comparable bonds. Thus, any pricing anomaly found using the 9 7/8s would be larger if either the 10 5/8s or the 11¼s were chosen as the comparable bond.' Figure 2 presents an overview of the apparent pricing anomaly using the 9 7/8s as the comparable. The figure plots the difference between the yield to maturity on the 9 7/8s and the yield to maturity on the 9¼s at weekly intervals. It shows that when the 9¼s began trading their yield was about 15 basis points less than the yield on the 9 7/8s. This differential is not surprising in light of the fact that the 9¼ bonds were then "on the run."
5 It is similar to the differential between the 9 7/8s and the other comparable bonds that existed when the 9 7/8s were on the run. In early March, however, the differential rose to over 25 basis points before returning to 15 to 20 basis points at the end of April. On May 8 new 30-year, 7¼ percent coupon bonds were sold by the Treasury and replaced the 9¼s as the on-the-run issue. Rather than declining when the 7¼ were issued, the yield differential between the 9 7/8s and 9¼s jumped to over 50 basis points.
The role of the repurchase market.
Direct exploitation of relative pricing anomalies requires that traders be able to establish short positions. In the government securities market, the least expensive way for traders to go short is via the repurchase market. Thus, before examining the price behavior of the 9¼ bond in more depth, it is helpful to describe the operation of the repurchase market.
In a repurchase transaction, or "repo," a government securities dealer sells securities to an investor and simultaneously promises to repurchase them at a higher price on a specified future data. The interest rate corre-sponding to the difference between the sale price and the repurchase price is referred to as the repo rate. For repos involving Treasury securities, the only risk that the investor faces is the possibility that the dealer will not be able to carry out the repurchase as promised. In that case, the investor may suffer a loss on the securities held. Such losses, however, are limited to the return on the Treasury security purchased, which is only a small fraction of the funds invested. For this reason repo rates typically are close to risk-free rates. Repos are most frequently made for one business day (overnight), although longer maturities are not uncommon.
A reverse repurchase agreement is the mirror image of a repo: The dealer buys the securities from the investor and simultaneously promises to resell them at an agreed upon price on a specified future date. Government securities dealers use reverse repos to establish short positions in Treasury securities. The security is acquired by means of a reverse repo and then sold outright. Later, the security is purchased outright and delivered under the terms of the reverse repurchase agreement.
The cash flows associated with a short position depend on the maturity of the repurchase agreement that is used to establish the position. This relation is illustrated by considering the two polar cases. In the first case the short position is financed by a single fixed-term repurchase transaction. In the second case the short position is financed by a sequence of overnight repurchase transactions. All other short positions financed by repurchase transactions can be seen as combinations of these two cases.
To illustrate the first case, assume that the investor has decided to hold the short position for t days, that accrued interest is added to the bond price, and that no coupons are paid during the period in question. In a term reverse repo the dealer buys a bond today at its current price P(0) and agrees to resell it on day t at the price P(0) (I + r) t , where r is the t-day repo rate. To establish a short position the dealer enters into a term reverse repo, sells the bond outright today, and buys it outright on day t to deliver against the reverse repo agreement. No cash is required to establish the short position because the funds necessary to buy the bond in the reverse repo, P(O), are equal to the receipts from selling the bond outright. On day t the dealer buys the bond outright for price P(t) and delivers it to satisfy the reverse repurchase agreement. The net cash flow to the dealer at time t is would be produced by entering into a forward contract at time 0 that matures at time t with a forward price of This first case is somewhat artificial because the term of the short position is assumed to be known in advance. A more realistic scenario is one in which reverse repurchase agreements with a maturity of one day are rolled over until the dealer decides to cover the short position. Taking account of the outright sale of the bond today and the outright purchase on day t, the sequence of cash flows produced by this transaction is where r t is the one-day reverse repo rate on day t. The sum of the cash flows (ignoring interest on the interim payments) is Although this cash flow is not identical to that produced by financing the short position with a term repo, simulations (not reported) show that the difference between the two is very small for reasonable. changes in the repo rate and bond price paths.
6 For simplicity, it is assumed that the t-day term repo rate is equal to the geometric average of the realized overnight repo rates over the next t days. Thus, profits on the short position are calculated as where r is the geometric average repo rate over the period during which the short position is held.
Because the repo market and the cash market are closely integrated, any pricing anomaly in the cash market is likely to be reflected in the repo market. The links between the two markets can be best understood by recognizing that a dealer who engages in a reverse repurchase transaction is effectively lending funds to the bond's current owner in order to acquire use of the bond. Suppose, for example, that dealers believe that the Treasury 9¼s are overpriced and would like to short the 9¼s using the reverse repo market as described above. Depending on the elasticity of supply, it is possible that the repo rate could be driven down below the riskless interest rate as dealers attempt to acquire the bonds in reverse repo transactions. Thus, there are two ways to detect relative pricing anomalies for Treasury bonds. One is to compare relative prices in the cash market. The other is to compare repo rates on transactions collateralized by different Treasury securities. In this article, we use both approaches.
Further findings
The first measure of the pricing anomaly is calculated from the relative prices of the 9¼s and the 9 7/8s This measure is an estimate of the profit potential for a dealer who sells the 9¼s (at the bid price) and invests the proceeds in the 9 7/8s (at the ask price). The measure is constructed as follows. First, it is assumed that the coupon payment dates and the maturity dates of the two bonds are the same. This assumption understates the true profit potential for a dealer who engages in this transaction because the cash flows from the 9 7/8s are received earlier.' Second, to avoid complications associated with the term structure, it is assumed that the dealer sells (9 7/8s/ (9¼) dollars of face value of the 9¼s for each dollar of face value invested in the 9 7/8s so that the net coupon payments from the strategy are zero and the dealer receives cash flows only at the outset and at the maturity of the position. If the 9¼s are overpriced, the cash flows on the dealer's position will be positive at the beginning and negative at the end. To compute the net cash flow of the position, the future cash outflow is discounted by the yield (at the ask price) of a 30-year zero constructed by stripping the principal from a 9 7/8 bond.
8 This net cash flow is referred to as the "theoretical arbitrage profit."
The second measure is the difference between the repo rates on the 9¼s and the 9 7/8s. In line with the earlier discussion, if dealers considered the 9¼s to be overpriced relative to the 9 7/8s, competition in the reverse repo market might drive repo rates on the former bond below those on the latter bond. Figure 3 shows the theoretical arbitrage profit and the repo rate difference on a weekly basis. The theoretical arbitrage profit, measured in dollars per $100 of par value, is shown over the interval from February 14, 1986 , to August 29, 1986 . Because of data limitations, the repo rates are shown only for the period March 6, 1986 , through June 27, 1986 . The data in Figure 3 are clearly anomalous. At the start of the period, the theoretical arbitrage profit is between $1 and $2 per $100 par value 9¼ bond shorted. It is probably inappropriate to say that this theoretical arbitrage profit represents an anomaly because the 9¼ bonds were the on-the-run issue. What is anomalous is that, as the May 8 auction of the 7¼: bonds drew nearer, the theoretical arbitrage profit rose instead of declining as is typically the case. The most surprising development occurred after May 12, when the 7¼ replaced the 9¼s as the on-the-run issue, Instead of shrinking, the theoretical arbitrage profit more than doubled. On May 23, dealers shorting the 9¼s and buying the 9 7/8s could have earned an essentially risk-free profit of $7.08 per $100 par value 9¼ bond shorted. After this date, the profit potential slowly declined until it came back to about $2 by the end of the period.
A similar phenomenon is apparent in the repo rate data. During the period March 6 to June 27, the repo rate on the 9 7/8s -and on all the other comparable bonds-was approximately 7 percent, a rate consistent with the overnight cost of funds observed in other markets, such as the federal funds market. Throughout this period, the repo rate on the 9¼s was loweroften much lower-than the repo rate on the 9 7/8s. After the week of March 28, the repo rate on the 9¼ bonds plunged 600 basis points to 1 percent, while the repo rate on the 9 7/8 bonds remained at approximately 7 percent. By the end of, April the 9¼ repo rate was down to 0.05 percent, and it remained less than 0.10 percent until the week of May 23, while the repo rate on the 9 7/8s never fell below 6.3 percent. During this one-month period, owners of the 9¼s were able to borrow at a close-to-zero interest rate on transactions secured by their bonds. Apparently, dealers were willing to make zero-interest-rate loans to bondholders in order to acquire 9¼ bonds and exploit the theoretical arbitrage profit. Figure 4 shows the repo rate and the theoretical arbitrage profit using daily data during the critical period beginning with the May 8 auction of the 7¼ bonds. These daily data are consistent with the weekly data: a repo rate close to zero for much of the period and a theoretical arbitrage profit that rises to $7.27 per $100 par value 9¼ bond shorted on May 22. On that day the 9¼ bond closed at a price 2/32 nds above the price of the 9 7/8s.
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Finally, examination of the postsample data further supports the view that the pricing of the 9¼ bonds in May was anomalous. By the end of the sample period on August 29, 1986, the theoretical arbitrage profit was again below $2. In the following months the theoretical arbitrage profit continued to narrow. By May 1987 the yields on the ll¼ bonds, the 10 5/8 bonds, the 9 7/8 bonds, and the 9¼ bonds were all within a few basis points of each other, and the theoretical arbitrage profit was essentially zero.
Costs of exploiting the anomaly
What has been called the theoretical arbitrage profit is true arbitrage for an individual who already owned the 9¼s; for a non-owner it is true arbitrage only if short selling is costless and the position is held until maturity. Because short selling takes place via the repo market, such short sales will be costly if the repo rate on the security is less than the short-term interest rate. Further, dealers have a high opportunity cost of capital and therefore
Theoretical arbitrage profit and the 9¼ repo rate; daily data May 7. 1986, to June 6, 1986
rarely choose to hold 30-year positions to maturity.
10 For these reasons, dealers attempt to exploit mispricing by taking short-term positions that will prove profitable if the mispricing disappears quickly. Figure 5 shows the effect of a below-equilibrium repo rate in the case of the 9¼ bond. In order for the short position to be profitable, must be greater than zero. Since P( t ) includes accrued interest it will tend to grow at the short-term interest rate unless the term structure or the relative price of the bond shifts. If the repo rate r is low the dealer will lose money until the relative price adjustment occurs. In Figure 5 , the repo rate is assumed to be 0.10 percent and the short-term interest rate is assumed to be 7.0 percent, which are their approximate averages during the key period. The figure shows that given these rates a dealer who takes a position when the theoretical arbitrage profit is $3.00 will make money only if the profit potential returns to zero in 23 weeks. Beyond that date the dealer would lose money even if the anomaly subsequently disappeared. Thus, in situations in which dealers cannot predict the exact timing of a price correction, they will limit the amount of capital they are willing to risk in order to exploit an apparent anomaly.
Possible Explanations for the Findings
A relative price differential need not be indicative of a pricing "anomaly." It also may reflect differences in risk, liquidity, maturity, coupon, and taxes. This section examines whether such factors can explain the peculiar relative price behavior of the 9¼ bonds. At the outset it is worth noting that in the case of the 9¼ bonds there is an added element that makes explanation more difficult: Whereas most widely discussed anomalies, such as the smallfirm effect and the January effect, involve differences in long-run average returns, the Treasury-bond episode involves a shift in relative prices that occurs suddenly and disappears almost as quickly. Such an episode is difficult to explain using any factor, such as taxes, coupon, or maturity, that does not also change rapidly.
Differences in liquidity
As noted earlier, the most recently issued long-term Treasury security is commonly referred to as on the run. When a bond is on the run, trading is more active and bid-ask spreads are lower. For instance, when the 9 7/8s were on the run the bid-ask spread reported in The Wall Street Journal was 4/32 nds while the bid-ask spreads for the ll¼s and the l0 5/8s were both 8/32. The lower spread and the higher trading volume for the on-the-run issue is one potential explanation for the short-run drop in the relative yield on the 9¼ bonds.
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The problem with this explanation is that the timing is wrong. As reported in the previous section, the theoretical arbitrage profit continued to rise after the May 8 auction of the 7¼ bonds and did not reach its peak of $7.27 until May 22. Nonetheless, there were no aberrations in the bid-ask spread during these two weeks in May. The bid-ask spread for the on-the-run issue (the 7¼s) was 2/32, the bid-ask spreads for the next two most recent issues (the 9¼s and the 9 7/8s) were 4/32, and the bid-ask spreads for the earlier issues of 30-year bonds were 8/32. This is precisely the pattern of bid-ask spreads that existed during earlier refundings, when the 9¼s and the 9 7/8s were the on-the-run issues.
Coupon, maturity, and duration
Explanations based on coupon and maturity (or duration, which is a function of both) also are not promising. First, as the discussion of the theoretical arbitrage profit in Section 1 illustrates, the difference in coupon and maturity between the 9 7/8s and the 9¼s is small relative to the shift in relative prices. Second, there are larger differences in coupon and maturity between the 9 7/8s and the 10 5/8s and 11 1/4s, but Figure 1 shows that there is no relative pricing shift among these three bonds. 
Taxes
Although taxes can affect bond prices in several ways, none of the effects is consistent with the behavior of the 9¼ bond prices. The most obvious explanation for anomalous relative prices of the type documented here is a special tax that was short-lived and unique to the security whose relative price changed. However, there was no such tax.
The distinction between capital gains and ordinary income for tax purposes can also affect relative bond prices. But for that distinction to explain changes in relative bond prices, as opposed to a constant yield differential, it must be associated with a change in the level of interest rates. However, during the key period examined here there was no sharp shift in the level of interest rates. Furthermore, explanations of relative price shifts based on the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income should be observed for all pairs of bonds that offer differing amounts of coupon income (and normal amortization to par) versus capital gain. Thus, if the jump in the price of the 9¼s relative to the 9 7/8s were due to a tax effect associated with the smaller coupons on the 9¼s a similar shift in relative prices between the 11¼s and the 9 7/8s would have occurred.. Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984) showed that bond prices are affected by the tax timing option. This raises the possibility that the relative price anomaly was due to a change in the value of the timing option. The problem with this explanation is that it does not explain why only the 9¼ bond was affected. For example, if the tax timing option rose as a result of an increase in the expected volatility of interest rates, prices of all long-term bonds would be affected. While it is true that the value of the 9¼s, which had the longest duration, would be most affected by an increase in the variability of interest rates, any gap between the yields on the 9¼s and the 9 7/8s that arose because of the timing option should have been mirrored by a gap between the 9 7/8s and the 11 ¼ and this did not occur.
Strategic trading by major investors
The traders who provided the repo rate data argued that the anomaly documented here was due to strategic actions of large Japanese investors. According to this hypothesis, the Japanese (the traders claim) recognized that American dealers typically short the current on-the-run issue prior to an auction to take advantage of the relative price decline that occurs when a new issue replaces it. In the case of the 9¼ bonds, Japanese investors supposedly purchased a large quantity at the auction. As the auction of the 7¼ bonds approached and American firms began to short the 9¼s, it is alleged that Japanese firms continued to buy them, despite their high relative price. This active buying by the Japanese pushed up the price of the 9¼s and the theoretical arbitrage profit at the same time that active short selling was depressing the repo rate. By the time of the 7¼ auction, Japanese investors supposedly held such a large fraction of the 9¼ issue that it became difficult for American firms to cover their short positions or to get bonds in the reverse market to honor their commitments. The Japanese were thus able to squeeze American dealers, who eventually caved in as a result of the cost of carrying the short position and repurchased the 9¼s at premium prices. This explanation is consistent with the data, because it was not until the repo rate rose sharply, indicating short covering by American dealers, that the theoretical arbitrage profit began to decline, indicating profit-taking by the Japanese.
The short-squeeze hypothesis has the advantage that it accounts for the up and down anomaly in relative prices that is difficult for equilibrium theories to explain. The disadvantage is that the hypothesis is ad hoc. Strategic behavior on the part of large traders can be offered as an explanation for almost any short-run movement in relative prices. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a few large dealers could have a significant impact on a market as broad as that for U.S. Treasury securities. Nonetheless, the traders argue that while the Treasury security market can be treated as perfectly competitive in most circumstances, the competitive model is only an approximation. Although opportunities to observe it are rare, the strategic behavior of a few large traders can affect prices.
Conclusions
Whatever the explanation, there is intriguing evidence of an anomaly in the relative price of the 9¼ bonds. Not only did the price of the 9¼ bonds get out of line with that of comparable bonds, but the overnight rate for borrowing on transactions secured by the 9¼s was close to zero for a period of almost two months. Nonetheless, standard tests for market efficiency would not have detected an anomaly. A comparison of the weekly returns on the 11¼ bonds, the 10 5/8 bonds, the 9 7/8 bonds, and the 9¼ bonds reveals no significant differences. The mean returns, standard deviations of returns, and autocorrelation functions for the four bonds are essentially identical over the sample period. 13 For example, the first-order autocorrelations of returns are -.01 for the 11¼, .03 for the 10 5/8s, -.0l for the 9 7/8s, and .02 for the 9¼s. The fundamental problem is that described by Summers (1986, p. 592) : "Statistical tests that have been used to date have essentially no power against at least one interesting alternative to market efficiency."
It is also worth noting that the relative price anomaly cannot be a rational bubble of the type analyzed by Tirole (1985) and West (1987) . Because all future cash flows, including the maturity price of a Treasury bond, are known with certainty, there can be no self-fulfilling expectations path based on misperceptions of what the terminal date price of the bond will be.
This article also illustrates some problems that investment firms face when attempting to exploit an apparent anomaly. In most situations the positions that traders establish to exploit an anomaly are risky, because over the short run the anomaly may worsen, as it did in this case, rather than disappearing. In addition, the positions may be costly to maintain. Thus, the ability of traders to earn excess returns depends on when they take a position and when the pricing anomaly disappears.
Problems of unpredictability as to whether and when a pricing anomaly will disappear are more serious for anomalies involving securities with random payouts, for then exact comparables do not exist, and traders face the added problem of determining whether, in fact, a pricing anomaly even exists. If they are Bayesians, traders will revise their prior belief that an "anomaly" exists based on the subsequent behavior of security prices. The longer an "anomaly" persists, the more likely it is that a Bayesian trader will conclude that he was wrong to assume that there was an anomaly in the first place. There is, therefore, greater pressure to close out positions that are not profitable quickly.
In this sense, the Treasury-bond market is not representative, because relative price deviations can be detected by direct comparisons between comparable bonds. While this makes the researcher's job easier, it also makes the arbitrager's job easier. If transaction costs are low, relative price deviations that can be easily identified should be quickly eliminated. What is so surprising about the case of the 9¼ bonds is that a substantial relative price anomaly persisted for over a month in a market that probably comes as close as any other to satisfying traditional perfect market assumptions.
In this context, the results reported here raise the possibility that relative pricing anomalies of the type documented here could be quite common in the equities market. First, pricing anomalies are more likely to arise in these markets than in the Treasury-bond market because transaction costs are greater and because the random payouts on the securities make it more difficult to identify, or even to define precisely what is meant by, a profit opportunity. Second, traders may not be willing to take large enough positions to eliminate the anomaly quickly. As Black (1986) observes, the presence of "noise" means that traders can never be certain that they are trading on information about value rather than noise. If traders are riskaverse, and if there are only small expected per-period profits to be made by trading against the apparent mispricing, then it may be possible to have large and persistent deviations of price from "fundamental value."
